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In The Supreme Court 
of the State . of Utah 
LOUIS J. :MONTER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
KRATZER'S SPECIALTY BREAD 
COMP ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
12810 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This was an action by a landlord for restitution 
of leased property and a counterclaim by the tenant for 
damages resulting from wrongful eviction of the tenant 
by the landlord. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE 
IN TRIAL COURT 
The Court entered a Judgment for Plaintiff-Ap-
pellant in the amount of $2,166.99 and for Defendant-
Respondent on its counterclaim in the amount of 
$102,278.56, plus $3,000.00 punitive damages. 
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STATEl\lENT OF Ij'ACTS 
Defendant-Respondent does not agree with Plain-
tiff-Appellant's Statement of Facts, since it alleges 
some facts not in the record and mistates and omits 
other relevant facts. Therefore, the following State-
ment of }_,acts is presented by Defendant-Respondent: 
On February 28, 1970, the Plaintiff-Appellant, 
LOUIS J. :MONTER, leased the property at 1241 
l\lajor Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to Defendant-
Respondent, KRATZER'S SPECIALTY BREAD 
COl\lP ANY, for five years, by a written agreement 
(Exhibit 2-D). This lease agreement was amended by 
the execution of an addendum to the lease on December 
10, 1970 (Exhibit 3-D), which provided for a forty-
five day grace period for the payment of the monthly 
lease payments of $47 5.00. 
l\lonthly lease payments were paid by KRAT-
ZER'S to l\IONTER until August of 1971. On Sep· 
tember 28, 1971, l\10NTER caused a "Three Day 
Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate" ( R. 51) to be delivered 
to KRATZ"F.H'S place of business. On October 1, 1971, 
a check drawn by Donna Poulson, an employee of 
KRATZER'S was delivered to MONTER's attorneys 
in payment of the August lease payment. l\frs. Poulson 
had made arrangements with her bank to cover this 
check ( R. 179), but when it was presented to the bank, 
it was returned marked "refer to maker." 
On October 18, 1971, :MONTER's attorneys filed 
a Complaint asking for restitution of the property and 
J 
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"following restitution for leave to amend this Complaint 
to include a prayer for damages resulting from waste 
caused by the Defendant, rent lost by Plaintiff until 
a new tenant is obtained ... " (R. 84-87). A three-day 
Summons was delivered to the Sheriff on October 28, 
1971, and served upon KRATZER'S on October 29, 
1971, a Friday. ( R. 52-53) . Jerome Y eek, President of 
KRATZER'S, contacted .MONTER's attorney on 
November 3, 1971, and told him he had records show-
ing the rent had been paid. He was instructed to bring 
his records in and was led to believe that no default 
would be taken in the meantime ( R. 7'8a) . These records 
were instead taken to KRATZER'S attorneys' office 
and an answer to the Complaint was prepared and 
filed on Friday, November 5, 1971. ( R. 79, 80) . It was 
later discovered that MONTER's attorney had filed a 
default judgment on the morning of November 5, 1971, 
providing for the issuance of a Writ of Restitution (R. 
73). A Writ of Restitution was issued and placed in the 
hands of the Sheriff for service on the same day by 
1\fONTER's attorney (R. 43-45). 
On :Monday, November 8, 1971, the sheriff and 
MONTER's attorney entered the premises of KRAT-
ZER'S at 1241 :Major Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
between 12 :30 and 12 :45 o'clock P.l\tI., stopped work 
at the premises, ordered all employees out, changed the 
locks on the doors, and closed down the operation of 
KRATZER'S business. Between 1 :15 and 2:00 o'clock 
P.M., KRATZER'S attorney had a telephone conver-
sation with MONTER's attorney, who was still at the 
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bakery with the Sheriff. In that conversation, KRAT-
ZER'S attorney quoted Section 78-36-10 U .C.A. to 
l\IONTER's attorney, and further told him they had 
no right to close down the bakery on that day and if the 
actions of MONTER, through his attorney and the 
Sheriff, caused any loss of business or damage, a law-
suit would be commenced against l\IONTER. In spite 
of this warning, l\IONTER's attorney instructed the 
Sheriff to go ahead with the eviction and the Sheriff 
did so. ( R. 39-40, 148-149). 
After several more telephone conversations that 
day, l\IONTER's attorneys decided they were acting 
wrongfully in closing down the business and later gave 
the Sheriff a release to allow KRATZER'S employees 
back in the premises. It was approximately 5 :30 o'clock 
P.l\I. before they were back to work. (R. 149-150). In 
the meantime, while the bakery was closed, Continental 
Baking Company, a customer of KRATZER'S for 
more than sixteen years (R. 158), had been unable to 
call their orders into KRATZER'S. Continental Bread 
Sales :Manager, Jack Hart, thereupon personally went 
to l\:RATZER'S Bakery, found the premises locked 
and nobody present and then placed their orders with 
another bakery. From that day on, in spite of KRAT· 
ZER'S attempts to regain its business, Continental has 
refused to buy from KRATZER'S because, in view of 
the closing of the business, it had no assurance that it 
would continue to get products from KRATZER'S. 
Although Continental had experienced some quality and 
delivery problems with KRATZER'S, Mr. Hart testi· 
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fied that these were considered normal and typical of 
other bakers as well. He further testified that Continen-
tal would not have terminated the long-standing rela-
tionship with KRATZER'S except for their inability 
to obtain products on N evember 8, 1971, and that had 
this incident on November 8, 1971, been the only inci-
dent to occur, Continental would still have terminated 
the account. ( R. 125-129). 
KRATZER'S thereupon filed a motion to set 
aside the default judgment, stay execution and allow 
the filing of a counterclaim ( R. 7 4) , and tendered into 
Court $1,42.5.00, representing the lease payments for 
August, September, and October of 1971, all of which 
was not yet past due. (R. 57). This motion was granted 
on November 19, 1971, ( R. 69), and trial set for De-
cember 10, 1971, at the request of MONTER's attor-
ney. KRATZER'S counterclaim was filed November 
22, praying for damages for lost business in an unknown 
amount, but in excess of $5,000.00 and also $5,000.00 
punitive damages. (R. 62). 
Priar to the trial, statements were presented to 
l\IONTER's attorney showing the volume of business 
done by KRATZER'S with Continental prior to Con-
tinental's termination of the account. These statements 
were verified to NIONTER's attorney by Jack Hart of 
Continental. Statements were also presented as to the 
relative costs to and profits realized by KRATZER'S 
on this account. Based on this information, it was stip-
ulated at the trial, that KRATZER'S received an av-
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erage gross income from Continental of $2,000.00 per 
month and that 53% of this, or $1,060.00 per month, 
was profit. ( R. 153-154). There was no evidence that 
the relationship with Continental would not continue 
indefinitely into the future and, of course, 1\fr. Hart 
of Continental testified that the acocunt would not 
have been terminated except for the actions of MON-
TER. (R. 128). 
Based upon present value tables in evidence and 
the testimony of an expert witness, the Court determined 
the present value of the lost profits of KRA TZER'S 
of $1,060.00 per month over ten years into the future 
to be $102,278.56, and entered judgment therefor. The 
actions of l\10NTER, by and through his attorneys, 
were found to he wrongful and because done with full 
knowledge of the law and in spite of warnings, were 
intentional and malicious. Therefore, punitive damages 
of $3,000.00 were also awarded. 
l\IONTER thereafter filed a motion for a new 
trial claiming surprise and newly discovered evidence. 
This motion was denied by the Court because it was 
obvious from the pleadings and transcript that there 
was no surprise (R. 14-15). The so-called new evidence 
was known to l\10NTER and had been available to his 
attorneys prior to trial, from the same sources from 
which they subsequently obtained the inofrmation. Fur-
thermore, in spite of the actions of the Internal Rev· 
enue Service, KRATZER'S business is still in opera· 
tion and has every prospect of continuing. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The court property held that the eviction of De-
fendant-Respondent and closure of it.Y business was 
wrongful and in violation of the provisions of Section 
78-36-10 U.C.A. The judgment was invalid and execu-
tion on its was untimely. 
The pertinent provisions of Forcible Entry and 
Detainer statute define unlawful detainer ( § 78-36-3), 
prescribe the manner of service ( § 78-36-6) , set out the 
allegations required in the Complaint ( § .78-36-8), and 
describe the matters for which judgment may be taken 
and when it may be enformed (§ 78-36-10). The fol-
lowing language from these provisions is important to 
a determination of the propriety of l\10NTER's actions 
in this case: 
"78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint 
.... In case the unlawful detainer charged is 
after default in the payment of rent, the com-
plaint must state the amount of such rent .... " 
(emphasis added) . 
"78-36-10. Judgment - of restitution; for 
damages and rent. . . . When the proceeding 
is for an unlawful detainer after default in the 
payment of the rent, and the lease or agree-
1nent under which the rent is payable has not 
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by its term.~ expired, e;reculion upo11 the judg-
ment shall not be issued until the expiration of 
five days after the entr.lJ of the judgment, 
within which time the tenant or any sub-tenant, 
or any mortgagee of the term, or other party 
interested in its continuance, may pay into court 
for the lnncUord the amount of the judgment 
and costs, and thereupon the judgment shall 
be satisfied, and the tenant shall be restored 
to his estate; but if payment as herein provided 
is not made within the five days, the judgment 
may he enforced for its full amount, and for 
the possession of the premises. In all other 
cases the judgment may be enforced immed-
iately." (emphasis added) 
It should be noted that :MONTER failed to com-
ply with these provisions from the time his Complaint 
was filed, the result of which was to deny KRATZER'S 
right to pay rent into court and be restored to its 
estate. The Complaint did not ask for any judgment 
for rent, but only for restitution and for leave to amend 
following restitution to pray for rent lost and for 
waste. This was done in spite of the statutory require· 
ment that the Complaint must state the amount of rent 
in default. The unlawful detainer claimed by MON-
TER was after an alleged def a ult in the payment of 
rent and the proceeding was brought specifically for 
failure to pay that rent, and for no other reason, asap· 
pears from the "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Va-
9 
cate" (R. 51) served upon KRATZER'S. This notice 
states that action would be commenced " ... to take 
judgment against you for the rent accrued .... " This 
notice must be the basis of any unlawful detainer pro-
ceeding brought by MONTER and any proceeding for 
waste or breach of covenants would be improper. It 
should also be noted that MONTER made no attempt 
to prove any waste or breach of covenant at the trial, 
but only non-payment of rent. Since the alleged unlaw-
ful detainer was based solely upon non-payment of rent, 
it was wholly improper for :Monter to ask only for resti-
tution in his Complaint and not for a judgment for 
unpaid rent. The effect of this is to deprive the tenant 
of the substantive right, granted by the statute, to pay 
the rent into court and be restored to his estate. Based 
upon this fact alone, the judgment for restitution was 
invalid. V 011les v. Stralw, 77 Utah 171, 292 Pac. 913, at 
914 (1930). Therefore, any action taken on that judg-
ment was wrongful. 
Having obtained an improper judgment, however, 
MONTER failed again to comply with the statute 
when he attempted to enforce his judgment for restitu-
tion by causing a Writ of Restitution to be issued on 
Friday, November 5, 1971, the same day judgment was 
entered, and then causing the Sheriff to wrongfully 
evict KRATZER'S from the premises and close down 
KRATZER'S business on Monday, November 8, 1971. 
Section 78-36-10 U.C.A. requires execution upon n 
judgment to wait five days after entry of the judg-
ment "when the proceeding is for unlawful detainer 
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after default in the payment of rent, and the lease ... 
has not by its terms expired." This was precisely the case 
before the court. KRATZER'S had a long-term lease 
which had more than three years to run. It is perhaps 
important to note that this five-day waiting period does 
not apply to the majority of unlawful detainer cases 
which are brought for holding over after termination 
of month-to-month tenancies, tenancies-at-will or ex-
pired leases. This important statutory right to be re-
stored to the estate is given only to those who have a 
substantial investment in a longterm lease and_ perhaps 
related leasehold improvements, trade fixtures and 
equipment. 
A. landlord may not repossess his property with-
out resorting to the remedies provided in the Forcible 
Entry and Detainer statute, regardless of his le.goal ri!lht 
to the property, and the failure to follow the proYisions 
of the statute gives the tenant a cause of action for the 
invasion of his rights under the statute and he should 
be awarded any damages proved. King v. Firm, 3 Utah ' 
2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 ( 1955). The facts in the case 
now before the court are almost identical to those in the 
case of Freewall Parle Building, Inc. v. TVestern States 
TVholesale SupplJJ, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 
( 1969). In that case an action was commenced to col-
lect past due rentals under a long-term written lease. 
A Writ of Attachment was obtained and the attorney 
for the landlord accompanied the officer executing the 
"\iV rit and directed him to attach the inventory and to re· 
move the tenant's employees and change the locks on all ' 
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of the doors. The tenant counterclaimed for wrongful 
attachment and wrongful eviction. The court held that, 
even if the attachment was lawful, the eviction was un-
lawful for failure to follow the requirements of the un-
lawful detainer statute and the landlord was liable for 
such damages as it caused including possibie punitive 
damages. That case governs the instant case and the 
eviction of KRATZER'S by .MONTER was accord-
ingly wrongful and in violation of the rights of tenants 
granted by § 78-36-10 U.C.A. 
The foregoing conclusion applies whether judg-
ment is taken by default or after a trial. The attempt 
by appellant in his Brief to apply the five-day waiting 
period in § 78-36-10 only to judgments after a trial and 
not to default judgments is strained and far-fetched. 
A tenant should not be deprived of a substantive right 
expressly granted by statute by strained implication 
from former statutes. There is certainly no express in-
dication in the former or present statute~ nor any sug-
gestion, that default judgments were to be treated dif-
ferently than judgments upon a trial. In fact, it is just 
as reasonable to imply that the failure to re-enact the 
old provision with respect to default judgments was 
for the purpose of bringing all judgments, default and 
otherwise, under§ 78-36-10. The heading of that section 
is not entitled "Trials" or anything similar. It is entitled 
"Judgments." And no other section deals with defaults. 
The particular provision containing the five-day wait-
ing period is not limited by the necessity for a trial. It 
is only qualified by the words "When the proceeding is 
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for an unlawful detainer after default in the payment 
of the rent, and the lease or agreement under which the 
rent is payable has not by its terms expired." Neither 
the original nor the present statute has been construed 
in the manner appellant is now suggesting. The right 
granted by § 78-36-10 is a matter of importance and if 
it did not apply in certain cases one would expect the 
legislature to expressly say so. 
l'urthermore, why could not a tenant decide, in the 
interest of saving time, trouble and expense, to give up 
his right to contest the disputed amount of rent, allow 
a default to be entered and then tender the rent into 
court and be restored to his estate as the statute pro-
vides .. Moreover, the statute grants the same right to 
pay the rent into court during the fi\'e-day waiting 
period to "any sub-tenant, or any mortgagee of the 
term, or other party interested in (the lease's) continu· 
ance." These are parties who might not be, and probably 
are not, parties to the action and they should not be de-
prived of their statutory right because judgment is taken 
by default. The suggested distinction between defaults 
and trials does not make sense when viewed in this light. 
The only reasonable interpretation is that the five-day 
waiting period applies to all judgments based on de~ 
fault in rent due under unexpired leases. 
Appellant's reliance on Commercial Block Realty 
Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah 505, 267 
Pac 1009 ( 1928), appears to be misplaced. There the 
court is emphasizing the fact that the statute was de· 
signed to provide the tenant with safeguards. The case 
J 
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states that even if the tenant fails to tender the rent to 
the lancllord, "he is not deprived of his lease. He may 
await the judicial determination of the amount of rent, 
and after judgment pay the rent and costs and be re-
stored to his estate." The court does not suggest that 
the tenant must dispute the amount of rent or that a 
triable issue must be involved. Rather, it indicates that 
the tenant may wait until after judgment to pay the 
rent and costs. 
Again, the suggestion of appellant that the statute 
doesn't apply in this case is untenable in view of the fact 
that no judgment for rent was sought. The Complaint 
asked only for restitution and did not yet bring the 
matter of rent before the ocurt. KRATZER'S protect-
ed its position anyway by tendering $1,425.00 into court 
within the five-day period. This amount represented 
the rent claimed to be in default and also rent for addi-
tional months which was not yet delinquent. However 
sincerely appellant now urges a different interpreta-
tion, he was apparently convinced of the wrongfulness 
of his actions on November 8, 1971, when he decided to 
allow KRATZER'S back in the premises. Of course, 
the damage had already been done by then, but after 
the warning issued by KRATZER'S attorney and a 
full afternoon to consider the matter, appellant and his 
attorneys obviously realized that KRATZER'S rights 
had been violated and damages might result. Otherwise, 
there would have been no reason to allow KRAT-
ZER'S back in the premises. 
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II. 
The Forcible Entr.IJ and Detainer . ;;tatute is a spe-
cial statutory proceeding and the Rule.~ of Civil Pro-
cedure covering execution do not apply in this case. 
Section 78-36-10 U.C.A. grants to a tenant a sub-
stantive right to pay a judgment for rent and be re-
stored to his estate under an unexpired lease. That sec-
tion sets forth the time after which execution may issue. 
The required five-day waiting period is automatic and 
requires no action by the tenant to make it effective. 
The argument by appellant that Rule 62 (a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure supercedes or replaces 
the tenant's rights under § 78-36-10 flies in the face 
of the express conditions as to applicability of the rules. 
Rule 81 provides as follows: 
"AP,PLICABILITY OF RULES 
IN GENERAL 
(a) Special Statutory Proceedings. These 
rules shall apply to all special statutory pro-
ceedings, except insofar as such rules are by 
their nature clearly inapplicable .... " (em-
phasis added) 
It would appear that no rule could be more clearly 
inapplicable to proceedings upon execution under §78-
36-10 than Rule 62 (a) providing for immediate execu· 
tion upon a judgment. Unlawful detainer is a special 
15 
statutory proceeding providing particular rights and 
remedies and prescribing the means of enforcing them. 
"\Vhere the Rules of Civil Procedure are in conflict with 
this statute, the Rules do not apply. The Rules are 
clearly inapplicable where they deprive a tenant of a 
substantive right granted by statute. Appellant might 
just as well argue that the manner of service of un-
lawful detainer notices prescribed by § 78-36-6, or that 
the shortening of the time for appearance to three days 
prescribed by § 78-36-8, or that the ten-day time for 
appeal prescribed by § 78-36-ll, do not apply in un-
lawful detainer proceedings because the Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide a different manner or time for these 
matters. The Forcible Entry and Detainer statute is 
ohYiously a special statutory proceeding to which the 
Rules of Civil Procedure are in many respects clearly 
inapplicable. 
Even if the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute 
is not a special statutory proceeding, the Rules of Civil 
Proceclure "may not abridge, enlarge or modify the sub-
stantive rights of any litigant." § 78-2-4 U.C.A. In 
this case, the legislature has prescribed that a tenant has 
a right to be restored to his estate and the procedural 
rules cannot abridge or modify that right. Only the leg-
islature can do so. Appellant argues that requiring a 
court order for a stay of execution is not clearly in-
applicable, citing as authority the fact that the Cali-
fornia statute, upon which Utah's statute was based, 
has been amended to do exactly that (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 16). The point is that Utah's statute has not 
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been amended and only the legislature can do so. There· 
fore, in Utah, the automatic five-day waiting period is 
still the law. 
Appellant claims that a rule requiring an af firma-
ti,·e act by the party seeking a stay of execution would 
not abridge, modify or enlarge his right to such a stay. 
In doing so, he overlooks the fact that § 78-36-10 was 
designed to prevent an immediate execution and that it 
may take the losing party more than five days to ob-
tain a stay of execution, especially if he must prepare 
and file a motion for a stay and set it for hearing be-
fore the court. By that time, the five-day period will 
have expired and the motion for a stay is a useless 
gesture. Furthermore, Rule 62 (a) leaves the granting 
of a stay within the discretion of the court and upon 
such security as the court may require. This is in direct 
conflict with § 78-36-10, which makes the stay auto-
matic, not disrretionary, and requires no security to ob-
tain the stay. In fact, the payment of the rent and 
costs into court within the five days is all the security 
the landlord needs. It should not be necessary to state 
that if the judgment for restitution is taken by default 
or if another party interested in the continuance of the 
lease, but not a party to the action, desires to pay the 
rent into court to preserve the lease, the execution will 
have been served and the damages done before it is 
known that a judgment has been entered. This is pre· 
cisely what happened in the case now before the court. 
The appellant's interpretation therefore emasculates 
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the rights of the tenant and other parties as granted by 
the legislature. 
III. 
The damages found by the Court were proper and 
were supported by the evidence and stipulations of the 
parties. 
The Court's findings as to the fact that damage 
had been caused to KRATZER'S by the wrongful ac-
tions of :MONTER and as to the amount of those 
damages were fully supported by the evidence. In fact, 
the evidence was almost wholly in favor of the findings 
and it is difficult to see how the Court could have found 
otherwise. Of course, the findings of the Court are pre-
sumed to be correct and should not he disturbed if there 
is some support in the evidence. These are cardinal rules 
of review. Charlton v. Hackett, II Utah 2d 389, 360 
P.2d 176 (rn6I). 
The fact of damage was proved by the testimony 
of an impartial witness (R. 123 and 129) and there 
was no evidence introduced by .MONTER to contradict 
his testimony. It was first established that Continental 
Baking Company had been a customer of KRAT-
ZER'S for seventeen years-a long-standing and ob-
viously compatible and continuing relationship. Then 
.Mr. Jack Hart, the Bread Sales l\Ianager of Continen-
tal, testified that Continental's salesmen had been un-
able to reach KRATZER'S by telephone on November 
8, 1971, to place orders for the next day, so he person-
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ally went down to KRATZER'S place of business to 
determine the reason. After finding the ha kery locked 
and closed up and nobody on the premises, he returned 
and placed their orders with another bakery. Continental 
has since refused to do further business with KRAT-
ZER'S because l\lr. Hart felt he had no assurance that 
he could continue to get products from KRATZER'S 
in view of l\IONT.ER's actions. Although Continental 
had experienced some quality and delivery problems 
with KRATZER'S, :Mr. Hart testified that these were 
considered normal and typical of other bakers as well. 
Then Mr. Hart responded to questions as follows: 
"Q In spite of those other problems you 
have mentioned, was your inability to get 
products on November the 8th the reason for 
your termination of your business with 
KRATZER'S? 
"A Yes, I'd say so. 
"Q Would it be fair to say that you 
would not have terminated that relationship 
then except for that inability? 
"A Yes." (R. 128} 
On cross-examination, Mr. Hart further responded 
as follows: 
"Q Had this incident on November the 
8th been the only incident to occur in your ex-
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perience, would you have terminated the ac-
count? 
"A I think, under the conditions that 
existed that day, yes." (R. 129) 
Based upon the uncontroverted testimony, it was 
certainly reasonable for the Court to conclude that the 
long-standing relationship between KRATZER'S and 
Continental would have continued into the future ex-
cept for the wrongful actions of .l\IONTER in closing 
down KllATZER'S business. Appellant's attempt to 
bring this unchallenged testimony into question is based 
upon a recitation of the facts out of context with no 
ref ercnce to the record and the omission of other rele-
vant facts .. l\Ir. Hart's lack of assurance of getting 
products was not based on other problems, as claimed 
by appellant, but on the closing of the business on No-
vember 8, 1971, and the uncertainty as to what further 
action l\IONTER might take. The attempt to base the 
termination of KRATZER'S on the fact that it had 
new management is also out of context since the present 
manager had been with Continental during the entire 
relationship with KRATZER'S, starting as clean-up 
boy and progressing through delivery boy to baker and 
.Manager. (R. 157-158). 
As to the amount of damages, appellant has de-
voted a considerable portion of his Brief to citation of 
out-of-state cases to the effect that damges for lost 
profits must not be speculative or conjectural. None of 
these cases is directly in point~ although some of them 
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may support respondent's position. It must be remem-
bered that future profits, while allowable as damages, 
cannot be proYed by any other means than projection 
from past profits. The general law as to proof of lost 
profits is found in 22 Am.J ur. 2d., Damages: 
"§ 172 . 
. . . . No recovery can be had for loss of profits 
which are determined to be uncertain, contin-
gent, conjectural, or speculative. Thus, no re-
covery can be had for loss of profits where it 
is uncertain whether any profit at all would 
have been made by the Plaintiff. But it must 
be _borne in mind that prospective profits are 
to some extent uncertain and problematical, 
and so, on that account or on account of the 
difficulties in the way of proof, a person com-
plaining of breach of contract is not deprived 
of all remedy; uncertainty merely as to the 
amount of profits that would have been made 
does not prevent recovery .... 
"§ 173. 
A distinction is drawn between claims for 
profits derived from a new business venture 
and those derived from a going concern .... Ac-
cordingly, recovery for lost profits is not gen-
erally allowed for injury to a new business 
with no history of profits. The same prohibi-
tion does not apply to the established business 
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with an experience of profits .... 
"§ 177 . 
. . . it is generally held that prospective profits 
from an established business, prevented or in-
terrupted by the tortious conduct of the de-
fendant, are recoverable when it is proved 
( 1) that it is reasonably certain that such 
profits would have been realized except for the 
tort, and ( 2) that the lost profits can be ascer-
tained and measured, from the evidence intro-
duced, with reasonable certainty .... 
" ... Where the wrongful act of the defendant 
is of such a nature as to prevent determination 
of the exact amount of damages, the defendant 
is not allowed to insist on absolute certainty, 
but only that the evidence show the lost profits 
by reasonable inference .... " 
In the case now before the Court, there is no prob-
lem of uncertainty or speculation as to the amount of 
damages. Respondent appeared in Court with a box 
full of records, prepared to prove the volume of busi-
ness done by KRATZER'S with Continental prior to 
November 8, 1971. These records and a typed summary 
of them were presented to appellant prior to the trial 
and after examination of them and consultation with 
the representative of Continental, appellant voluntarily 
decided to shorten an otherwise lengthy trial and stip-
ulate to certain facts which KRATZER'S could prove 
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and he could not controvert. It was therefore stipulated 
that, considering seasonal variations and other factors, 
the average monthly volume of business done with 
Continental by KRATZEH'S was it;2,ooo.oo. Of this 
amount, 47% was overhead and 53% or $1,060.00 was 
profit. The Court was not required to speculate or con-
jecture as to damages, but could easily base its findings 
on the stipulation of the parties. The Com-t was then 
assisted by the testimony of an expert witness to de-
termine the present value of this average monthly 
profit over various periods of time into the future based 
upon prevailing interest rates and present value tables 
in evidence. 
The only question that could be raised is as to the 
length of time over which this monthly profit should be 
considered. The Court's finding here is also amply sup-
ported by the evidence that this business relationship 
had existed for seventeen years and would have con-
tinued except for the actions of l\IONTER, as Mr. 
Hart testified. The fact that ~Jr. Hart took the time 
and trouble to go down to KRATZER'S place of busi-
ness, instead of just calling a competitor, indicates a 
desire to continue dealing with KRATZER'S and re· 
inforces l\Ir. Hart's stated intent to deal with KRAT-
ZER'S, again, except for MONTER's actions. The 
only speculation in connection with this finding is that 
proposed in appellant's Brief, in his desperate search 
to find some way to attack the unquestioned continua· 
tion of a long-standing relationship. The Court could 
have justified a much longer period of time over which 
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to assess damages, but settled on ten years, since the 
present value of J{IlATZER'S damages began to level 
off after ten years. 
In spite of the fact that the stipulated and uncon-
troverted facts of this case are more than sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of the general law quoted 
above, the Utah law requires less certainty and allows 
more inference in the determination of lost profits. In 
Freeway Parlo: Building, Inc. v. TVcstern States JVhole-
sale Supply, supra, the facts of which are cited above, 
this Court stated that "the landlord is in a poor position 
to insist that the damages he caused must be proved to 
a mathematical certainty." In that case, there was evi-
dence that the tenant had made a profit during the five 
months immediately preceding the landlord's wrongful 
actions. The records were not complete and an account-
ant, doing the best he could with what he had, calculated 
the gross sales for the five-month period and the net 
profit. The Court stated, at pages 783-784: 
"The fact that a business has not been in op-
eration long enough to have a history of profit 
or loss should not deprive one of the right to 
convince a jury, if he can do so, that he would 
have made a profit if his business had not been 
interfered with ...• 
"Where no books are kept in a simple business 
enterprise, an estimate of profits may be given 
by one who is experienced in the business. 
24 
Graham llotel Companv vs. Garrett, 33 S.W. 
2d 522 (Tex. Cir. A pp. 1930). 
"In this case concrete data was given in evi-
dence; and while the records were not suf fi. 
cient to give the exact prior earnings, we think 
they were sufficient to enable the jury to infer 
the amount of damages, if any, which were 
occasioned by reason of the wrongful attach-
ment and eviction, and thus to give a just 
verdict in the case. . . . 
" ... we also think the jury should be permit-
ted to determine whether the landlord acted 
maliciously in evicting the tenants so as to 
justify the imposition of punitive damages, 
and if so, the amount thereof." 
In the case before the Court, the Trial Judge, sit-
ting in place of a jury, should be permitted to make the 
same determination and the same inferences. Yet, the 
evidence is much stronger here since we are dealing with 
an established business with a long-standing relation-
ship with a customer and stipulations as to both gross 
and net profits. The only inference made was with re-
spect to the time that relationship might continue. This, 
of course, is impossible of proof as to the exact time, 
but the evidence is more than sufficient to support the 
inference made by the Trial Judge. 
The Freeway Park Building case is also authority 
for the propriety of punitive damages. There the land· 
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lord, acting entirely through his attorney and the execu-
ting officer, removed the employees from the premises, 
changed the locks on the door and closed down the busi-
ness. The Court stated that the jury would have been 
justified in finding punitive damages based on those 
facts. See also Har grave v. Leigh, 73 Utah 178, 273 
Pac. 2!)8 ( 1928), where the court, on similar facts, held 
that malicious conduct could be implied. In the case of 
KRATZEU'S bakery business, it is certainly obvious 
that even a temporary closure of the business would 
have an immediate detrimental effect on profits and 
customer relationships. Products must be produced and 
delivered on a daily basis and at precise times. The 
wrongful disruption of this kind of business should cer-
tainly be treated more seriously than the home-improve-
ment business in F'ree"l.cay Parle Building. The land-
lord's complete lack of concern for this obvious fact 
should also make the inference of' malicious intent much 
easier. Furthermore, the wrongfulness of MONTER's 
actions were made known to him and a warning given 
that suit would follow those actions prior to the time 
any serious damage had been done. l\lONTER's clos-
ure of the business in the face of this knowledge cer-
tainly constitutes an intentional and wreckless disregard 
of KRATZER'S rights. This is sufficient to consti-
tute malice in law, if not in fact, and is easily the basis 
for the implication or inference of malice as is proper 
under both Hargrave v. Leigh, and Freeway Park 
Building, cited above. 
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Appellant complains that the trial court did not 
consider the effect of the loss of the Continental ac-
count on the total business of KRATZER'S nor that 
KRATZER'S might have mitigated the damages by 
obtaining other customers to replace Continental. This 
is not the type of case where mitigation of damges is 
required. To state that KRATZER'S must find other 
customers to replace the loss caused by l\IONTER is 
to deny KRATZER'S the right to grow. It has a right 
to the profit from all the customers it can obtain. Had 
:MONTER not caused the termination of the Continen-
tal account, KRATZER'S business could have grown 
and become more profitable with each new customer 
obtained. If these new customers must replace Conti-
nental, KRATZER'S are denied the profits to which 
they are otherwise entitled. Appellant relies entirely 
upon Gnttinger v. Cala1.'Cras Cement Company, 105 Cal. 
App. 2d 382, 233 P.2d 914 ( 1951), for his position that 
the total business must be considered. That case is whol-
ly inapplicable. There suit was brought to enjoi~ a 
nuisance created by discharges from a <'cment company 
and for damages caused to nearby cattle businesses dur-
ing the three years prior to the time of trial. An injunc-
tion was issued and there was no question in the case 
as to future damages. Only losses already incurred 
were in issue and those were not, but should have been, 
proved by the Plaintiffs from the actual effect on their 
business as a whole during the past three years. That 
case is also distinguishable from the instant case be· 
cause it was based on the loss to the cattle businesses of 
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a portion of their production facilities (the land on 
which their cattle were pastured) which does not neces-
sarily cause a loss in total production or total or net 
income. Had :MONTER caused damage to some of 
KRATZER'S equipment, which might not have been 
in use or necessary to total production at the time, then 
this case would have been comparable. However, the 
loss caused to KRATZER'S was of a substantial 
customer which directly and obviously caused a loss of 
income. Fixed overhead remains the same, labor and 
materials may be saved, but income is lost whether or 
not the rest of the business is affected. In fact, the ef-
fect of this loss to KRATZER'S on the total business 
was stipulated to at the trial when the income from the 
Continental account was apportioned 47% to overhead 
and 53% to profit. The effect on the total business of 
KRATZER'S was a loss of profit in the amount of 
$1,0GO.OO per month. Appellant can not now complain 
about a fact which he has established by his own stip-
ulation. It is also possible that the loss to KRATZER'S 
could have been established by proof as to total income 
before and after November 8, 1971, but the trial in this 
case was set on December IO, 1971, at the insistence of 
appellant. One month was not nearly enough time to 
establish the difference in income after l\tIONTER's 
wrongful action, let alone compile the records of that 
business and present them to the Court. KRATZER'S 
established its damages "by the most accurate basis 
possible under the circumstances." It produced "the 
best evidence reasonably obtainable." Quoting from ap-
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pellant's Brief, page 26, and 1llt. States Telephone & 
Telegraph Compa11.11 t'. Ilinchcliffe, 204 F. 2d 381, at 
383 (10th Cir., 1953). 
Appellant further relies on Schoenberg v. Forrest, 
253 S.\V. 2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App., 1952), a case in-
voking breach of a twenty-year contract. Damages were 
based upon only eight months' experience under that 
contract which the court held to be insufficient upon 
which to speculate as to what might happen over the 
next twenty years. That case, too, does not help appel-
lant since here we have seventeen years' experience 
which would have continued into the future except for 
the actions of .l\IONTER, as l\lr. Hart testified. There-
fore, no speculation into the future is involved, only 
a reasonable inference based upon undisputed facts. 
Appellant also claims that the trial court has as-
sumed that there will be no changes in the business in 
the future-'no increased competition, no increased 
costs, no depressed market, etc. It should be sufficient 
to point out that appellant produced no proof of the 
possibility of any of these matters. Furthermore, the 
trial court did not consider the possibility of an increase 
in business with Continental, nor of an increased profit 
margin based upon better equipment or efficiencies. 
Appellant has chosen to ignore the other side of the 
coin. KRATZER'S has met its burden of proof and 
the Court has made the findings based upon ample evi· 
dence. Having failed to produce any evidence to the 
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contrary, appellant has no reason to complain of the 
findings and judgment in KRATZER'S favor. 
IV. 
The Trial Court properly denied appellant's mo-
tion for a new trial. 
After the court rendered its judgment in this case, 
appellant filed a motion for a new trial asserting as 
grounds therefor, surprise, newly discovered evidence, 
excessive damages, insufficient evidence and error in 
law. The court denied this motion for failure to estab-
lish any of these asserted grounds. The only ground 
upon which appellant now complains of the court's de-
nial is that of claimed newly discovered evidence. This 
is based upon two alleged facts which are not true and 
there is nothing in the record to support them. 
Appellant implies that he could have produced 
evidence at the trial that KRATZER'S owed a debt 
to the Internal Revenue Service which might have af-
fected the court's decision and that evidence of this 
debt was not available at the time of trial since no lien 
was filed until after trial. This fact is not true, as shown 
by the counter-affidavit in the record (R. 15). The 
l.R.S. filed a lien with the Salt Lake County Recorder 
on September 27, 1971. The only new evidence which 
justifies a new trial is that which could not have been 
discovered by the exercise of due diligence prior to 
trial. U.R.C.P. 59 (a) (4); Universal, Investment Co. 
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vs. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 564, 567-8 
( 1965). Furthermore, discovery after trial of matters 
of public record is not a ground for new trial unless on 
diligent search and inquiry in the proper office, such 
record is not discovered. Drcspel vs. Drespel, 56 Nev. 
368, 45 P.2d 7!l2, rch., 54 P.2d 226 (193.5); In re Ham-
mer's Estate, 145 Wash. 322, 260 Pac. 532. The so-
called new evidence claimed by appellant was a mat-
ter of public record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office as well as the office of the Internal Revenue 
Service long prior to trial. No showing has been made 
that appellant made any effort to discover this evidence 
prior to trial. The same diligence exercised by appellant 
and hiS' attorneys after trial, if exercised by them prior 
to trial, would have revealed this information and it is 
therefore not "newly discovered evidence. l\1oreover, 
the fact of this debt to the I.R.S. was known to :MON-
TER person~lly prior to trial ( R. 18) and he did not 
even bother to appear at the trial to tell the court what 
he knew ( R. 26) . The trial court did not consider this 
evidence sufficient to justify a different result. De-
cisions on new trial motions rest within the discretion of 
the trial court and since appellant has failed to show 
abuse, the trial court's decision should not be disturbed. 
Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets, Inc., supra. 
The further claim by appellant that respondent's 
business was closed within a month after trial and has 
remained closed, the latter being untrue, does not ac· 
count for the fact that appellant substantially con· 
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tributed to the cause of this closure by denying cash 
flow to respondent out of which the taxes could have 
been paid. Nor does it account. for the fact that re-
spondent immediately arranged for the continuation of 
that business and that respondent is presently actively 
engaged in the same business though at a reduced profit 
because of NlONTER's wrongful actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's findings and judgment are fully sup-
ported by the evidence and the law. By failing to sue 
for rent, appellant did not follow the requirements of 
the unlawful detainer statute and thereby obtained an 
invalid judgment. The actions of appellant in attempt-
ing to enforce that invalid judgment caused damages 
for which he must respond. Appellant's further refusal 
to follow the requirements of § 78-36-10, U.C.A. by 
waiting five days before executing on his judgment de-
prived respondent of his statutory right to pay the rent 
into court and be restored to his estate. This substantive 
right granted by the legislature cannot be abridged by 
the procedural rules. Only the legislature can abridge 
or modify this right. This statute does not permit a 
tenant to "thumb his nose" at his landlord nor does it 
deprive him of his property without due process of law, 
as claimed by appellant. The statute only applies in the 
limited situations where rent is unpaid under an un-
expired lease and it provides for full payment to the 
landlord of all rent, costs and fees. He receives every-
thing for which he has bargained in his lease plus his 
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expenses. Any provision in the lease providing that the 
landlord may re-take possession of the premises with. 
out following the requirements of the Forcible Entry 
and Detainer Statute is void as against public policy. 
Freeway Parl.;; Building, Inc. vs. TV cstern States 
Wholesale Supply, supra, at page 781. 
The court's determination of damages was based 
not only upon the "the best evidence reasonably obtain-
able" by respondent, but also upon the most unquestion-
able basis possible, the stipulations of appellant and 
the uncontroverted testimony of two impartial wit-
nesses-one of them an expert witness-all of which 
the trial court chose to believe. The damages were re-
duced to present value based upon prevailing interest 
rates. The punitive damages assessed were based upon 
the wreckless and intentional disregard by appellant of 
respondent's rights with full know ledge of those rights 
and of the c~nsequences. That is sufficient to imply a 
malicious state of mind. The fact that appellant was 
acting through his chosen attorneys does not relieve him 
from the responsibility for their acts. He is liable for 
the acts of his agents, especially when he has specifical-
ly instructed them to take whatever action they deter-
mine necessary. The attorneys cannot ask for mercy 
because their actions have caused damage for which 
their principal is liable. This is not "punishment" but 
responsibility. 
The appellant's assertions in this case are contrary 
to the law and the evidence and are based on some facts 
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not in the record nor proved at the trial. Since appellant 
has not shown that the trial court's findings have no 
support in the evidence, the trial ·court's decision should 
be affirmed. 
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